Showing posts with label Scholarship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Scholarship. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Tuesday Quick Hits: Scholarship Edition

The nerdery has been busy over the last week cranking out great stuff:
  • Scholars further debunk currency hawks' assertions that China's currency causes the bilateral trade balance.  Over at VoxEU, Fudan University's Zheng Song, the Minneapolis Fed's Kjetil Storesletten and the University of Zurich's Fabrizio Zilibotti argue that "it is wrong, and even dangerous, to blame [China's holdings of US debt] on a manipulation of the exchange rate." Instead they propose a "structural theory emphasising that credit market imperfections require private firms to build up internal savings which have been channelled into foreign bonds."  The elaborate: "Due to legal and financial market imperfections, private firms are financing themselves out of internal savings. The rapid growth of these self-financed firms and corresponding down-sizing of bank-financed firms creates and artificial lack of domestic investment opportunities for Chinese banks. As a consequence, a growing share of domestic savings is invested abroad and this generates a capital account deficit and matching current account surplus."  These findings are consistent with some of the things I've been saying here for a while.  Be sure to read the whole thing here.
  • Cato scholar Dan Ikenson cranks out some scholarly China scholarship.  In a new briefing paper, Ikenson writes: "Although it may be fashionable to think of China as the country to which the U.S. manufacturing sector was offshored in exchange for tainted products and a mountain of mortgage debt, the fact is that the bilateral relationship has produced enormous benefits for people in both countries. Despite those benefits, Americans are more likely to be familiar with the sources of friction....
       This paper examines the economic relationship and some of its high-profile sources of friction, distills the substance from the hype, and concludes that although some policy tweaks would be beneficial, a more aggressive U.S. policy tack is unnecessary and unwanted. Much more can be done to cultivate our areas of agreement using carrots before seriously considering the use of sticks."
  • PIIE scholar: raising taxes on "companies that ship jobs overseas" is stupid.  The Peterson Institute's Gary Hufbauer podcasts: "Obama's proposal to punish firms that ship jobs overseas would hurt the very firms that export products made in America."  Sounds familiar, no?

Sunday, March 21, 2010

Scoring the Great Trade Debate

A couple weeks ago, I did a quick blog entry directing readers to the “Great Trade Debate” between Cato’s Dan Griswold and Ian Fletcher of the US Business and Industry Council and hosted by the good folks over at WorldTradeLaw.net’s International Economic Law and Policy Blog.  Being the complete trade-nerd that I am, I eagerly awaited reading the clash between an immensely knowledgeable and unabashed free trader like Griswold and an admitted, ideological (as opposed to political) “proud protectionist” like Fletcher. 

Unfortunately, the debate didn’t turn out as I had hoped.  Don’t get me wrong: the exchange was interesting and produced a lot of good argument, but for the most part, the two debaters either talked past each other or simply spent their allotted space debunking the other’s prior stats and assertions.  Thus, the casual reader probably finished the debate just as he had begun it: confused about whom to believe and about which side he should support.

For my purposes, however, the debate was still immensely valuable because it provided a perfect example of how protectionists and free traders currently advance their arguments, and thus how free traders must revise their approach to the debate if they are ever to win the day.

Over the last year or so, I have attempted to show that for free traders to win the “great trade debate,” they must rethink their current, data-driven approach.  This means that before getting into all of the fancy charts and historical lessons, free traders first must demonstrate that trade is foremost a moral issue, and that free traders, not protectionists, are on the “right side.”  This is done simply by showing how anti-traders seek to forcibly thwart voluntary, mutually-beneficial cross-border transactions in order to transfer wealth from politically-underrepresented groups (i.e., individual consumers, service-providers, and downstream manufacturers) to other, politically-favored classes (typically heavy manufacturers or agribusiness).  It is reinforced by showing how protectionism is an invisible and regressive tax that disproportionately punishes low-income American families by forcing them to expend more of their paychecks to buy protected (and more expensive) food, clothing and shelter.  In short, protectionism is classic beltway politics, where special tax breaks, sweetheart deals and secretive earmarks rule the day.

Fletcher’s case is no different, even though he’s calling for an “across the board” tariff on all imported goods.  His tax on all US import consumption would be a massive wealth transfer from those consumers in non-manufacturing/farming jobs (engineers, lawyers, IT professionals, waitresses, nurses, doctors, marine biologists, etc. etc.) to the US manufacturing sector (which he just so happens to represent) and domestic farmers.  And oh by the way, a vast majority of all Americans work in jobs other than manufacturing or farming, so Fletcher’s “fair” tariff remains a giant, invisible, regressive tax on the many to line the pockets of the very few.  And of, course, it’s only achieved through government coercion.

The “unfairness” of this tax, and any other tariff like it, is clear, and once the free trader establishes these essential facts and the morality of his free trade position, he places the burden on the protectionist to prove why the coercive government intervention that he advocates is justified.  (We lawyers like to call this “burden shifting,” and it’s critically important in any debate.)  In short, the free trader can and should demand that the protectionist demonstrate why the common many should support the privileged few.

With the burden on the protectionist to prove why protectionism is justified, the debate might as well end, because the free trader will always win the day.   As I’ve repeatedly shown when debunking myriad “protectionist myths” out there, the facts simply do not support protectionists’ claims that (a) free trade harms the American economy, or (b) protectionism helps it.  And with the burden of proof on protectionists, the key here is causation, not mere correlation.  They must prove that trade causes pain, or that protectionism causes prosperity.  Spurious correlation (e.g., the trade deficit and manufacturing jobs), is wholly insufficient. 

In the Great Trade debate, like a lot of modern political debates on free trade or protectionism, the burden of proof was never established.  Griswold’s opening salvo provided a lot of great data, but never challenged the morality of Fletcher’s underlying position.  Without this challenge – without loudly impugning the morality of Flecther’s protectionism and demanding that he justify his regressive, immoral tax policies, Griswold left Fletcher free to simply rebut certain facts without ever actually justifying his own assertions that free trade causes economic harm and that widespread protectionism would cause prosperity.  As such, the debate devolved into a series of point-counterpoints, whereby each person debunked the other’s data.  

Indeed, Fletcher’s opening statement provides a perfect example of the problem.  He states:
The most recent scholarship on the issue casts huge doubt on traditional theoretical justifications for free trade and makes clear why the mercantilism that is being practiced against us can be such an effective economic strategy.  It is gradually realigning theoretical economics with both economic history and the common-sense experience of ordinary Americans.
Fletcher does nothing to actually prove such bold assertions.  He simply moves on to other, similarly-unsupported stances.  And his follow-up posts attack Griswold's positions without ever justifying his own.  As demonstrated above, however, such justification is very, very necessary, given that Fletcher is arguing for a massive wealth transfer from American consumers to manufacturers and farmers.  He must prove why we should support such a scheme.  Yet he never does.

And that's why Fletcher should have lost the Great Trade Debate instead of just running out the clock.  Hopefully next time, he won't be so lucky.

Friday, February 26, 2010

Finally, A Trade Dispute I Fully Support

WorldTradeLaw.net is hosting a great online debate on Free Trade vs. Protectionism between the Cato Institute's Dan Griswold and Ian Fletcher of the US Business and Industry Council.  Griswold is the author of Mad About Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization, and Fletcher is the author of Free Trade Doesn't Work: What Should Replace it and Why.  Safe to say that it's pretty obvious who will be arguing what in this debate (and which side I intensely favor).

The guys' opening statements have been posted today.  Griswold's is here, and Fletcher's is here.  Unsurprisingly, I already have a few comments on each post, but I'll save them to the end.  (Wouldn't want to influence your reading!)

Do enjoy.

Monday, November 9, 2009

Why Do Developing Countries Want FTAs with the United States?

AEI's Phil Levy has written a very thoughtful and provocative new study on Peru's motivations behind entering into the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA).  In it, Levy examines the evidence and interviews Peruvian business people and government officials to determine why they worked so hard to secure passage - at home and in the United States - and implementation of the PTPA when Peru was already enjoying duty-free access for more than 90% of its US-bound exports.  His findings will surprise most people:
Bilateral free trade agreements have generally been analyzed as instances of preferential reciprocal tariff liberalization. Viewed through this lens, such agreements raise concerns both about new competition and about trade diversion. The United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, an example of a serious North-South accord, demonstrates that new market access was not a principal Peruvian goal in the trade negotiations. Instead, the agreement was intended to encourage investment by locking in Peru's economic reforms. This motivation has very different implications for the global trading system than a quest for preferential access.
Read the whole thing here (PDF). Given the limited scope of the the Peru case study, Levy's findings raise a lot of important questions that demand further research (as he fully admits). But if these conclusions hold, it could have significant implications for the future of US trade policy - for example, (i) how the US targets future developing country FTA partners; (ii) how free traders sell these FTAs to the general public once they're complete; and (iii) how bilateral FTAs fit into a multilateral free trade agenda (i.e., at the WTO).

Great food for thought.