NY Fed: Labor Costs & Inflation Drive Rapid Increase in Chinese Consumer Goods Prices

In a must-read article, the NY Fed studies the prices of Chinese imports into the United States and comes to some very interesting conclusions.  First, the basics:

We find that, in a sharp reversal of earlier trends, U.S. import prices for consumer goods shipped from China have been rising rapidly in recent quarters—by 7 percent between 2010:Q2 and 2011:Q1. 

Second, the authors explain that appreciation of China's currency appears to have had a direct and measurable effect on Chinese imports of commodity-intensive industrial supplies (e.g., steel), but had far less (if any) effect on consumer goods like the iPod:

[B]etween 1997 and 2005, when the RMB was pegged to the dollar, prices in all major categories of imports from China were on a downward trend. This trend reversed itself when the RMB was allowed to appreciate against the dollar in 2005.

By separating commodity-intensive industrial supply prices from other categories, we see that between 2005 and 2009 higher import prices of goods from China were mainly driven by jumps in industrial supply prices—goods that rely heavily on commodity inputs. Over this four-year period, consumer prices only increased 7 percent, even though the nominal RMB appreciated 20 percent against the dollar.

This pattern changed in mid-2010, when the RMB started to appreciate again. Import prices of consumer goods rose by 7 percent between 2010:Q2 and 2011:Q1, a period in which the nominal RMB appreciated 4 percent against the dollar and the CPI-adjusted real RMB appreciated nearly twice as much.

Third, the authors explain that labor costs and inflation, not RMB appreciation, are very likely causing the recent price increases for Chinese consumer goods imports:

Sharply increasing wages for Chinese workers and other escalating costs faced by Chinese firms in the country’s coastal manufacturing export hubs may be contributing to the rising prices of consumer goods shipped to the United States. Indeed, heightened unrest by workers demanding improvements in pay and double-digit wage-increase settlements have been making headlines in recent years (see, for example, Economic Times, New York Times, and Financial Times). Although data used to construct manufacturing unit labor costs are far from ideal, we estimate that wage-based unit labor costs resumed their upward trend in 2010 at the fastest pace in at least a decade, after dipping in 2009 due to a softening of China’s manufacturing labor market during the global economic crisis (see chart below). Moreover, the government enacted a major new labor law in 2008 that has likely driven up overall costs for firms.

Fourth, the authors discuss why economic growth and demographic issues will probably cause Chinese labor costs to keep rising, thus jeopardizing China's global dominance as a low-cost manufacturer:

Cyclical and structural factors are likely contributing to the rise in Chinese manufacturing unit labor costs. In particular, strong wage growth has partly reflected the very rapid cyclical recovery of Chinese manufacturing following the post-Lehman global trade shock, as well as the role of stimulus policy in generating greater incentives for migrant workers to stay closer to their home provinces inland rather than move to the coast to find jobs. Structurally, China is generally acknowledged to be undergoing a profound demographic shift to a rapidly aging society at an unusually early stage in economic development. China’s prime manufacturing cohort of people ages fifteen to thirty-nine has already peaked in size, and the United Nations projects that the working-age population as a whole will peak sometime over the next decade (see chart below). This implies that the days of seemingly limitless “surplus” labor supply may be nearing an end. And indeed, anecdotal reports of labor shortages in China’s coastal manufacturing provinces have surfaced periodically since at least 2003 (see, for example, Financial Times and “Chinese Workers Get Perks—Labor Shortage Spurs Firms to Court Factory Employees Pressure on Pay—and Prices,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2004)—about the time manufacturing unit labor costs started to rise....

Firms may be able to partially adapt to heightened labor shortages in China’s coastal manufacturing hubs by enhancing efforts to raise productivity and by moving factories inland, where labor remains considerably cheaper. However, over the longer term, the demographic shift facing China is real, as is the government’s desire to encourage faster household income growth, rebalance the economy away from investment and toward consumption, encourage the development of inland provinces, and develop higher-value-added industries. This suggests that while China’s days as the world’s factory may not be numbered, the prospect of continued rising prices of Chinese goods seems highly likely.

Finally, the authors explain what rising Chinese import costs will mean for the American economy (hint: it's not good):

More expensive consumer goods from China would represent a significant shift in U.S. inflation pressures, given China’s history of being a low-cost supplier of consumer goods to the United States. While it is difficult to assess the precise impact of changes in import prices on U.S. inflation, there are a number of channels we can identify. First, higher prices of imported consumer goods contribute directly to the U.S. CPI. Second, imported goods also enter into the production of domestic goods as some of these are intermediate inputs, which contribute directly to U.S. producers’ costs and thus add further pressure to increase the price of domestic goods. Third, higher import prices of Chinese goods may allow competitors, which include other exporters to the United States and domestic producers, to also charge higher prices and thus increase their mark-ups. Alternatively, competitors may try to gain market share by keeping their prices low and thus offset some of the inflationary pressures from the higher import prices of Chinese goods.

In short, higher Chinese import prices mean inflationary pain for American families and companies, and any lost Chinese market share will be replaced not only by domestic producers but also other foreign competitors.

Given all of these facts, why are American politicians attacking China's currency policies again?   To maybe help a few US companies who produce commodity-intensive industrial supplies, while definitely harming many more US companies, consumers and workers who directly benefit from low-priced Chinese imports?

Oh, right: they're doing it precisely because they're politicians.

(h/t Mark Perry)

Protectionists Must Have Nightmares about the iPod

From Mark Perry comes even more proof that the iPod is a protectionist's worst nightmare.  I've already documented the growing number of iPod (and iPhone) studies which show that the modern global economy isn't, as our President and many other politicians claim, some sort of ruthless, zero-sum, "us versus them" competition among nations.  (Think Thunderdome without the bungee cords.)  The earlier "iPod studies" analyzed the iPod's and iPhone's global design and manufacturing processes and showed how, even though the gadgets say "Made in China," it's America, not China, that gets most of the profits from their sale.  The studies thereby demonstrated how modern global supply chains (i) have turned bilateral trade statistics into worthless measures of trade policy and (ii) can provide huge benefits for Americans beyond the obvious cost savings, even when the product at issue is wholly assembled abroad.

Now comes a new study published in the Journal of International Commerce and Economics which shows the dramatic benefits that the iPod's global manufacturing process - and American innovation more generally - deliver to the American workforce.  The abstract gives the study's basics:

Globalization skeptics argue that the benefits of globalization, such as lower consumer prices, are outweighed by job losses, lower earnings for U.S. workers, and a potential loss of technology to foreign rivals. To shed light on the jobs issue, we analyze the iPod, which is manufactured offshore using mostly foreign-made components. In terms of headcount, we estimate that, in 2006, the iPod supported nearly twice as many jobs offshore (27,250, see chart above) as in the United States (13,920). Yet the total wages paid in the United States ($746 million, see chart above) amounted to more than twice as much as those paid overseas ($318 million). Driving this result is the fact that Apple keeps most of its research and development (R&D) and corporate support functions in the United States, providing thousands of high-paid professional and engineering jobs that can be attributed to the success of the iPod. This case provides evidence that innovation by a U.S. company at the head of a global value chain can benefit both the company and U.S. workers.

Cool.  Perry also provides a great table to demonstrate the authors' topline data point:

The study's authors then conclude:

When innovative products are designed and marketed by U.S. companies, they can create valuable jobs for American workers even if the products are manufactured offshore. Apple’s tremendous success with the iPod and other innovative products in recent years has driven growth in U.S. employment, even though these products are made offshore. These jobs pay well and employ people with college degrees. They are at the high end of what might be considered middle class jobs and appear to be less at risk of vanishing from the United States than production jobs.

In short, even when an American-designed product is made overseas, it can - and often does - support tens of thousands of American jobs at pretty great pay.  And, oh, yeah, other countries benefit too.  Very, very cool.

So much for that ruthless competition, eh?

p.s. For those of you who might claim that we could have even more jobs if we lobbied the US government to force Apple to produce and assemble their gadgets in the United States, you'd be wrong: the devices would necessarily cost more to produce - maybe a lot more.  Thus, these "American iPods" would, at best, result in fewer sales and fewer support jobs (and R&D into new, supercool Apple stuff), and, at worst, they wouldn't exist at all when priced entirely out of the market.

Monday Quick Hits (World Champion Dallas Mavericks Edition)

I'm sure that you, like me, are still tired from celebrating the Mavs' ridiculously unexpected victory last night. So here's a little pick-me-up:

• Sec. Clinton: Free trade is great for everyone (except Americans!).  In all seriousness, if you've ever wondered whether the Obama administration's free trade foot-dragging reflects political opportunism or a sincere-yet-misguided misunderstanding of basic economics, wonder no longer.

• WTO Director General Pascal Lamy explains that, because of global supply chains, value-added is a much better way to measure trade flows, and old school trade stats "give us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between countries." A full WTO report on this issue gives us a detailed understanding of the abject absurdity of politicians' breathless claims about global trade imbalances based on the old metrics.  For example, on our elected officials' currency demagoguery, Lamy stated: "When products include many parts made in many other countries, the effect of an isolated exchange rate appreciation or depreciation to the selling price in export markets will be reduced to the domestic content of these exports, to its 'value added content'. This may explain why empirical studies about the impact of exchange rate changes on imbalances tend to show they only have limited or ambiguous effects."  Translation: the demagoguery is pretty much baseless.  Heritage's Bryan Riley has more on our misleading trade stats here.

• In a must-read editorial, George Will absolutely destroys the White House's refusal to submit pending FTAs to Congress without congressional assurances on expanded Trade Adjustment Assistance.  My favorite lines: "A government borrowing $58,000 a second cannot afford Obama’s policy of Stimulus Forever, and there is this problem with TAA at any level: It is unjust to treat some workers as more entitled than others to protection from the vicissitudes of economic dynamism. Consider a hypothetical Ralph, who operated Ralph’s Diner until Applebee’s and Olive Garden opened competitors in the neighborhood. With economies of scale and national advertising budgets, those two franchises could offer more choices at better prices, so Ralph’s Diner went out of business. Should he and his employees be entitled to extra taxpayer subventions because they are casualties of competition? Why should someone be entitled to such welfare just because he or she is affected negatively by competition that comes from abroad rather than down the street? Because national trade policy permits foreign competition? But national economic policy permits — indeed encourages, even enforces — domestic competition. In 2001, when approximately 80,000 people worked in 7,500 music stores, the iPod was invented. Largely because of that and other technological changes, today only about 20,000 people work in 2,500 music stores. Should those 60,000 people be entitled to extra welfare because they are “victims” of technology? Does it matter if the 60,000 have found work in new jobs — perhaps making or selling electronic devices? In 2008, Americans bought 1.4 billion books made of paper and 200 million e-books. Soon they will buy more e-books than paper books, and half the nation’s bookstores will be gone. Should the stores’ former employees be entitled to special assistance beyond unemployment compensation? Reactionary liberalism holds that existing jobs must be protected with policies that reduce the economic dynamism that would mean a net increase in American jobs. So the dreary probability is that even if the TAA entitlement were re-enriched to stimulus levels, Democrats would again move the goal posts, concocting new objections to the trade agreements."  Yep. 

• Speaking of TAA, I quite enjoyed this NYT op-ed from former Bush official Matthew Slaughter and former Clinton official Robert Lawrence about how to resolve the White House's self-imposed TAA/FTA impasse.  Their solution: (i) pass the FTAs as soon as humanly possible, and then (ii) scrap TAA and the current mishmash of other federal unemployment benefits and replace the ancient, broken programs with a more streamlined and rational system that is market-friendly and doesn't discriminate against Americans who lost their jobs due to technology or something other than (allegedly) trade policy.  I don't agree with everything they propose, but I love this idea (and have advocated something similar for a few years now): "enabling unemployed workers to make penalty-free withdrawals from savings accounts like 401(k)’s and I.R.A.’s to finance costs like occupational retraining and relocation."  Sadly, the chances of this deer-in-the-headlights White House actually doing something as rational and economically-beneficial as the Slaughter/Lawrence plan are, well, not good.

• Is the, ahem, "Chicago way" coming to Geneva?  The Peterson Institute's Gary Clyde Hufbauer reports on what he sees as a very troubling development at the WTO: USTR's attempt to block Appellate Body member Jennifer Hillman from serving a second term on the world's most important arbiter of trade disputes: "The United States has never before blocked its Appellate Body appointee from serving a second term. Since the USTR has offered no explanation for blocking Hillman, suspicions are bound to arise that the United States is displeased with her decisions on the AB and wants to name a judge who is more attentive to US positions in future cases. These suspicions are bound to erode confidence in the WTO judicial system, and create a chilly reception for Hillman’s successor appointee. 'Judicial independence' is a hallowed American concept, now enshrined in the WTO.... But as a member of the bar, as well as President, Obama should seriously reconsider this damaging precedent."

• Does CNBC get just how contradictory this ridiculous news story about the Japan tragedy and the US trade deficit is?  Compare and contrast (emphasis mine): "The after-effects from the March earthquake and tsunami in Japan left behind one on the US economy: An unexpected shrinking in the massive trade deficit. But that improvement may not last long….  Most of the $3.1 billion decline came from Japan and a $2.5 billion drop in auto-related imports. The tsunami devastated the Japanese auto industry, slowing parts distribution and production essential to US car manufacturing and sales."  So to recap: choking off essential inputs for US manufacturers is a "positive impact."  Riiiiight.  (h/t Bryan Riley) 

• The Mises Institute's Jeff Tucker explains how US treatment of Vietnamese catfish basa and swai is an "archetype of disgusting protectionism."  Yep.

• In case you're wondering, inflation and rising labor costs aren't isolated to China.  According to the WSJ, India's facing similar issues: "Maruti Suzuki India, the local unit of Suzuki Motor, is facing what's become a familiar hazard in the country: labor action. On Wednesday, a strike by about 2,000 workers at one plant entered the fourth day. With $9 million of potential revenue lost each day from the closure, the total is about $32 million, or close to 1.5% of last quarter's revenue. Maruti's troubles are the latest reminder of the effect of labor unrest as workers demand better wages and benefits, triggered partly by high inflation. Last month, a similar protest by the employees of national carrier Air India lasted nine days, causing a revenue hit of $30 million. In 2010, Hyundai Motor India had to rehire most of the employees it had sacked after a two-day protest that cost a similar amount."

• Slate's Bryan Palmer explains why Europe "sucks" at innovation.  The intro reads like an article from The Onion: "The French government has banned television reporters from using the words Twitter and Facebook when referring generically to social media, because all that free advertising gives the companies an unfair advantage." Sacre bleu! 

• Bloomberg's editors go back to basics, explaining why protectionism is politically attractive yet economically stupid.  The whole thing is worth reading, but I really enjoyed this quote: "Furthermore, the benefits of free trade do not require reciprocity. Avoiding tariffs and quotas is good for us whether China, Japan or Europe follow suit."  Exactly.

• In case you need further evidence of the White House's secret understanding of free trade's myriad benefits, here's video of CIA Director (and current Secretary of Defense nominee) Leon Panetta explaining the strategic importance of free trade, especially with our allies in Korea, Colombia and Panama (start at 6:04, with Sen. Rob Portman's smart line of questioning):

Panetta: Senator, I think that when it comes to protecting our security there are number of areas that have to be addressed and one of those obviously is not just the military responsibility but there is an economic side of this that plays a very important role in terms of promoting better security. The ability of these other countries to develop trade with us to develop their economies creates greater stability within those countries. I think that’s a fact and to the extent that we can help promote that kind of trade, that we can promote that kind of economic development, I think it assists these nations in their ability to achieve stability. Columbia is a good example. They have done a great job going after narco trafficking. If we can help, you know be able to help them develop their economy, that could become another added factor in providing greater security in that region and the same thing is obviously true for Korea.

That's all for tonight.  Go Mavs!

Short Article, Big Lessons

From Colombia Reports comes a great article that, on its face, seems to be just a short piece about foreign investment, but actually provides several great lessons about the global economy:

Colombia's largest cement company Argos has bought several cement plants in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina for $760 million, reported local media Thursday.

Argos Cements bought the plants from the French company Lafarge. Argos entered the US market in 2005 and says it plans to become the fourth largest ready mix producer in the U.S.

Chief Executive Jose Velez said in an interview as reported by Dow Jones "We are conservative in our outlook but we do expect more activity in 2010." Velez also said that he is not worried by the weak dollar or the strong peso.

"Because of the weakness of the dollar most of our inputs are cheaper now ... The net impact of the appreciation [of the peso] is zero at this time."

The purchase, which is still subject to approval from U.S. regulators, is part of an long term expansion strategy aimed at consolidating Argos' presence in the U.S. market.

So what kind of lessons can we draw from these few paragraphs?  Here's what I came up with:

• The obvious benefits of foreign investment in the US economy.  But for Argos' investment, these French-owned cement plants in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina may have gone out of business, eliminating hundreds of American manufacturing jobs in the process.  Now, let's just hope that those "US regulators" don't foul things up.

• Where all that great foreign investment wants to go.  All of Argos' $760 million investment is going to Right to Work States. i.e., states with laws prohibiting compulsory union membership.  Of course, as I've often noted here, foreign investment in these states - particularly those in the South - is part of a growing trend.  In fact, the empirical evidence shows that RTW states attract more FDI than their forced-unionization counterparts.  Of course, the economic dominance of RTW states isn't isolated to attracting foreign investment.  As Steve Moore and Art Laffer recently noted in a great WSJ op-ed: "As of today there are 22 right-to-work states and 28 union-shop states. Over the past decade (2000-09) the right-to-work states grew faster in nearly every respect than their union-shop counterparts: 54.6% versus 41.1% in gross state product, 53.3% versus 40.6% in personal income, 11.9% versus 6.1% in population, and 4.1% versus -0.6% in payrolls."

• How global supply chains erode the conventional wisdom on trade and currency and make import liberalization increasingly important.  Velez states: "Because of the weakness of the dollar most of our inputs are cheaper now ... The net impact of the appreciation [of the peso] is zero at this time."  This means that his company is importing raw materials from the United States or from countries whose currencies are pegged to the dollar.  Either way, it's a great example of how global supply chains have made old school currency dogma irrelevant, and why a strong currency and the elimination of import barriers are important for intermediate/downstream producers like, oh I don't know, the United States.  Now, if only there were a way for the United States and Colombia to instantly lower the vast majority of their bilateral trade barriers.  Oh, wait.

• The origins of that Colombian investment capital - the US-Colombia trade deficit.  One of the constant refrains here is that trade deficits are not "bad things" because, among other things, they necessarily lead to foreign investment in the United States.  As Cafe Hayek's Don Boudreaux put it, "another name for 'U.S. trade deficit' is 'U.S. capital-account surplus' – that is, inflows of investment funds into America that supply (directly or indirectly) financing for more capital creation in America."  (Mark Perry adds more here.)  In 2010, the United States had a $3.6 billion bilateral trade deficit with Colombia, and now $760 million is coming back to the U.S. as investment in domestic cement plants.  In short, Americans gave Argos and other Colombian firms our dollars, and now they're re-investing those dollars in the US economy.  Suddenly, those trade deficits aren't so scary anymore, eh?

I'm sure I missed something.  Feel free to add your lessons in the comments.

(h/t Monica Showalter)

Caterpillar CEO on Trade and How to (Really) Win The Future

President Obama and his underlings just love to talk about improving American competitiveness in order to Win the Future.  But what does the US business community - well, those not on the milky-end of the government teet - think about the current state of American policy and its impact on our companies' future global competitiveness?  Courtesy of HotAir comes a fantastic CNBC interview with the CEO of Caterpillar - one the shining stars of America's thriving manufacturing sector - on just those issues.  It's well worth your 15 minutes:



In short, Mr. Oberhelman sees the global economy not as a threat, but as a great business opportunity.  He's smartly positioned Caterpillar to take full advantage of both foreign and domestic market conditions - through things like advocating robust trade liberalization, currency hedging and maintaining near-total control over business operations in interventionist foreign markets - and he sees competitiveness-killing US government policies, not free trade or low-cost competitors in China or Brazil, as the greatest threat to his company's viability and the future of the American economy.

And what kind of US government policies are undermining our global competitiveness and thus jepoardizing our companies and jobs?  I'll let Oberhelman explain:



My favorite quote:

We've announced three or four arguably brand-new facilities [in the United States] bringing work in from outside. And frankly we weigh all of these things in which state is the most business friendly. It's not a question of labor cost or who's cheaper. If you chase cheap labor around the world, you're never going to win. It's a lot more than that. The state's got to be competitive.  The country's got to be competitive....  You see states going the other way [from Illinois], where they're very pro-business and reducing taxes, and guess where we land our plants that are very competitive.... The latest and greatest is in Texas.  We brought a plant that in the past has assembled hydraulic excavators in Japan for shipment to the U.S.... we've moved that plant to south Texas... 5,000 to 6,000 units a year, 600 to 700 high-paying assembly jobs.

Nice.  And how exactly does Mr. Oberhelman think the current administration is doing to keep American companies strong and competitive?  Well, the answer to that is in the second video, but I'll let HotAir spell it out for you.

(Hint: it's not good.)

The Unbearable Asininity and Immorality of Donald Trump's China "Policy"

I was really hoping to stay out of the whole "Donald Trump is Running for President" thing, because I truly believed (and pretty much still do) that (a) the spectacle was just a really good, and slightly depressing, publicity stunt for the reality TV star; and (b) anything I said would just give the guy another free commercial (albeit for an extremely limited market).  Thus, any discussion of this unserious "candidate's" completely unserious "trade policy" - which is literally nothing more than the immediate imposition of tariffs on all Chinese imports - was really just a waste of my and, by extension, your time.  

But then I saw the (admittedly early and utterly unpredictive) polls, and then I read that he's deathly serious about running for President, and then I went on the Laura Ingraham Show and found that smart conservatives like Laura (and a lot of her listeners) actually sympathized with Trump's "get tough on China" plan.

So here I am wasting a quiet Easter Weekend screaming into the interwebs about Donald Trump's - Donald Freaking Trump's - China trade policy.  I hate to say it, but this really does need to be done.  So let's just hold our collective noses and get this over with.

As noted above, Trump's entire trade policy boils down to slapping unilateral tariffs on all Chinese imports as soon as he gets into office.  Here's the man himself describing his big plan to NBC News:

"I would tell China, very nicely, fellows, you are my friend, I like you very much. I've made a lot of money on China by the way, a lot of money with China. I would say we are going to put a 25 percent tax on all your products coming in, and that's going to do a number of things," Trump said.

"Number one: as soon as they believe it's going to happen, they will behave so nicely, because it would destroy their economy,” said Trump in an interview with NBC’s Today show on Tuesday.

Playing up to voter fears on the loss of jobs to China, Trump said the transfer of cash to the Chinese was down to Beijing’s controversial currency peg.

"When you see what China is doing to us, what we're going to lose this year, $300 billion to China. And they are taking all of our jobs, and they are doing it through manipulation of their currency," Trump said.

Trump's China policy is wrong on just about every possible level: factually, legally, economically, strategically, morally and even politically.  Let's systematically address each of these now.

1. Trump gets his basic facts wrong. 

Before we get to Trump's tariff policy itself, it's important to understand the serial fallacy of Trump's basic factual assertions, i.e., that (a) China's currency remains extremely undervalued versus the US dollar; (b) China's currency policies are driving both the US-China trade balance and US unemployment; and (c) that the US trade deficit, and especially the United States' bilateral trade deficit with China, is a big problem for the US economy.

As I've noted here many times, China's currency policies are not nearly the vehicle of economic destruction that Trump and others claim them to be.  First, Trump erroneously focuses on the nominal US-China exchange rate (what the government says the currency is worth), rather than the real exchange rate (what the currency is actually worth).  It's the real rate that matters, as any "businessman" like Trump should know,  because it measures what tradeable goods and services actually cost.  And, as I've noted repeatedly here, the real dollar-yuan exchange rats has increased dramatically - almost 50% percent - since 2005.  Second, as the real value of China's currency has increased, American unemployment has gone from about 5% in 2005 to slightly under 9% today, and the US-China trade deficit has (except for the recession) steadily increased.  So there's no strong connection between China' currency and total American jobs or the trade balance (as the Congressional Research Service has repeatedly noted).

Next, Trump's assertion that $300 billion annual US-China trade deficit is a sign that America is "losing at trade" is the height of economic ignorance.  First, there's actually a strong correlation between US economic growth and an expanding US trade deficit.  As Cato's Dan Griswold recently wrote in a must-read paper on the subject:

An examination of the past 30 years of U.S. economic performance offers no evidence that a rising level of imports or growing trade deficits have negatively affected the U.S. economy. In fact, since 1980, the U.S. economy has grown more than three times faster during periods when the trade deficit was expanding as a share of GDP compared to periods when it was contracting. Stock market appreciation, manufacturing output, and job growth were all significantly more robust during periods of expanding imports and trade deficits.

And if fixating on the overall US trade balance weren't dumb enough, Trump goes one further and obsesses over an even more economically meaningless stat when he worries about the US-China trade balance.  As I've noted here repeatedly, the proliferation of global supply chains and multinational investment has rendered bilateral trade balances a totally unimportant trade policy metric.  Indeed, old school trade stats like these have become so obsolete that the WTO has launched a new global initiative to determine how better to account for actual trade flows.  The most common example of the indisputable obsolescence of the US-China trade deficit is the iPhone (and the iPod before that): each device imported into the US from China accounts for about $300 towards the bilateral trade deficit, yet the Chinese get only about six bucks worth of value from the item's assembly and shipment.  Meanwhile, the US-based Apple and its affiliates get hundreds of dollars from an iPhone's final US sale (for things like design, marketing, and even some manufacturing).

Even the idea that China is totally dominating the United States is absurd.  Yes, China has experienced impressive GDP growth, but (a) that's what developing countries do; and (b) America is still much, much wealthier, greener, and more productive.  Moreover, China's incessant quest for GDP growth through industrial planning has led to some pretty scary inflation (which is driving China's the increase in the Yuan's real value), some major league economic distortions (e.g., a frightening property bubble and an increasingly troublesome high-speed rail system), and a lot of other serious problems that, if not solved pretty quickly, could implode the entire Chinese economy.  Always the empiricist, Trump once "proved" how China was "eating our lunch" by noting how big and shiny China's cities are.  Well, on that, he's right, but that's because no one is actually living in them.  I mean, it's so easy to keep a city clean without the, you know, citizens.

There are several other factual problems with Trump's assertions, but let's just forget about these big flaws and examine Trump's actual policy - unilateral tariffs on Chinese imports to counteract Chinese currency "manipulation" (aka the "Trump Tariff").  As you'll see, it's just as wrong.

2.  The Trump Tariff has major legal problems. 

First and most obviously, the President can't just slap a tariff on Chinese goods.  The US Constitution (Article I, Section 8) gives Congress the sole authority to impose tariffs on foreign-made goods (i.e., "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"), so Trump would have to get congressional approval for his big China plan.   But considering that the most protectionist Congress in the last 20 years couldn't even pass legislation making currency undervaluation an illegal subsidy (and fretted for months over the WTO-consistency of the bill), does Trump really think that this new Congress - and its gaggle of free trade-supporting freshman - would agree to his plan?  Highly unlikely.

Second, there are several US laws that govern the imposition of remedial tariffs on Chinese (and other) imports, and these laws have strict procedural, evidentiary and substantive requirements that can't just be ignored.  Illegally subsidized imports from China (and other countries) are governed by the US countervailing duty law, while market-distorting surges in Chinese imports may be addressed under Section 421 (a China-specific safeguard).  President's Trump's remedial tariff would totally (and unlawfully) circumvent these laws.

Finally, the Trump Tariff would be inconsistent with two of the United States' most fundamental obligations under the WTO agreements: (i) Most Favored Nation (GATT Article I - the principle that a WTO Member must treat imports from all other Members equally) and (ii) the United States' tariff bindings (GATT Article II - the rule that a WTO Member cannot impose tariffs above the "bound rate" set forth in its tariff schedule).  Such a blatant violation of WTO rules would have serious consequences for the United States, as we'll discuss next.

3.  The Trump Tariff is economically ignorant.

Even assuming that Trump somehow convinced Congress to impose the Trump Tariff, its effects wouldn't be anything like Trump hoped or planned.  In fact, the tariff would end up causing a lot of pain (for both China and the US) for little or no economic gain.   First, as noted above, the Trump Tariff is blatantly WTO-inconsistent, so China would go straight to the WTO and easily win the right to impose retaliatory tariffs on US exports in the amount of the damage caused by the tariff.  Based on 2010 stats, the retaliation would be something like 25% (the proposed tariff level) of about $365 billion (total Chinese imports), or about $91 billion.  Considering that US exports to China totaled only about $100 billion in 2010, this WTO-legal retaliation would effectively close the United States' third largest export market - a devastating result for one of American exporters' fastest-growing markets (US exports to China have more than doubled since 2005).

Second, the economic pain wouldn't stop with US exporters because the Trump Tariff, just like any other consumption tax, would inevitably increase US prices of everything that American consumers currently buy from China.  Remember, US importers, not Chinese exporters, pay US tariffs and pass those on to American consumers.  This, of course, means that American families, many of whom are already struggling to get by, would end up paying more - a LOT more - for food, clothing, electronics, Smithsonian souvenirs, and everything else that now says "Made in China."  However, individuals wouldn't be the only ones screwed by the Trump Tariff - American businesses (and their many workers) would also be hit hard.  Because almost half of what we import from China is industrial supplies and materials or non-automotive capital goods - i.e., inputs used by American companies - lots and lots of these firms would inevitably pay more for the things that they need to remain globally competitive.  These higher costs, of course, also mean fewer employees, if not outright bankruptcy.  Awesome.

Third, it's highly unlikely that the Trump Tariff would lead to a significant increase in US manufacturing.  Sure, a few directly competitive US companies would benefit from that sweet, sweet import protection (by being able to milk US consumers for more money, natch), but the far more likely result is trade diversion - i.e., our imports would shift from China to other (more expensive) foreign countries like Vietnam, India or Mexico.  This is exactly what happened when the US imposed tariffs on Chinese tires under Section 421, and it's the very common result in anti-dumping and CVD cases.

Finally, even if the Trump Tariff succeeded in getting China to rapidly appreciate its currency (and, as noted below, it won't), it's far from certain that such appreciation would harm China's global competitiveness.  As Cato's Dan Ikenson stated last year: "RMB appreciation not only bolsters the buying power of Chinese consumers, but it makes Chinese-based producers and assemblers even more competitive because the relative prices of their imported inputs fall, reducing their costs of production. That reduction in cost can be passed on to foreign consumers in the form of lower export prices, which could mitigate entirely the intended effect of the currency adjustment, which is to reduce U.S. imports from China."  As an intermediate producer and big assembly hub, China is importing more these days than they did during the last period (2005-2008) of nominal currency appreciation, so Ikenson's insights likely hold truer today than they did even a few short years ago.

In sum, the Trump Tariff would cause massive pain for very, very little gain.

4.  The Trump Tariff is strategically unsound.

Even if the Trump Tariff weren't legally and economically dubious, it's still an awful strategic play.  The idea that the Chinese government would just roll over and concede "defeat" in the face of President Trump's big, macho tariff is absurd.  First, Trump fails to grasp that the Chinese government would never, ever do anything that makes it appear weak in the face of American aggression.  Instead, retaliation, not concession, is the far more likely reaction (just as China did when President Obama imposed those tire tariffs), and such sinophobic chest-thumping would likely retard, not quicken, the gradual appreciation of the yuan that China needs to undertake.  Second, China's not nearly as dependent on the US market as Trump seems to think.  The EU is now China's biggest export market, and Chinese exports to the US represent under 30% of China's exports to its top 10 export destinations.  So while the US market is big and important, China has other options.  Third, China couldn't rapidly and dramatically appreciate its currency even if it wanted to because any such move would implode the Chinese - and by extension, global - economy.

But, you know, other than that, it's a fine plan.

5.  The Trump Tariff is immoral.

Leaving aside the Trump Tariff's legal, economic and strategic problems, perhaps most offensive is its immorality.  As noted above, one of the most obvious effects of the Trump Tariff would be higher prices for American consumers. Trump even seems to recognize this obvious fact, and when asked about it he calmly explained:

But that's a risk Trump is willing to take. He says his son can live with fewer toys, as long as jobs come back to the United States.

"I have a son, and he loves little airplanes ... Most of them are made in China ... He has so many of 'em," Trump told CNBC's Larry Kudlow last month. "If he had half of 'em, and if they were made in this country, I'd be very happy ... and he'd be just as happy."

Other than the fact that those jobs wouldn't come "back to the United States," this kind of statement is mind-blowingly insulting, even for someone like Trump.  As I've repeatedly explained on this blog, tariffs are regressive taxes that harm poor Americans far more than wealthy ones like Donald Trump because they force the former to pay a bigger share of their (much smaller) paychecks for basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter.  Tariffs on Chinese products are even more problematic because lower income Americans buy a lot more Chinese stuff than rich Americans.  In short, when prices at Walmart go up, Donald Trump doesn't notice, but a working mom sure does.  And the only ones who benefit from those higher prices are a few well-connected American manufacturers and their workers.  Nice.

And this gets back to the brazenness of Trump's "toys" statement: sure, he can tolerate his son only having 10 higher-priced toys instead of 20 Chinese-made toys, but what about the dad who can currently afford only one toy for his son?  Last time I checked, he can't buy half a toy (or tire or shirt or TV or whatever), so for many lower income American families, the Trump Tariff doesn't mean ten fewer toys, it means no toys (or tires or shirts or TVs or whatever).

Stay classy, Donald.


6.  The Trump Tariff is the exact opposite of fiscally conservative, libertarian or "Republican."

A lot of people have dismantled Trump's born again conservativism by noting how he until very recently supported things like universal health care and eminent domain abuse, but his protectionism is just as bad or worse.  Indeed, it's the height of statist redistributionism.  Trump forgets that American consumers are buying Chinese goods voluntarily - last time I checked China wasn't loading missiles with TVs and launching them into the US (although that would be kinda awesome).  And he freely admits that the goal of his policy is to force American businesses and families to subsidize (by paying higher prices) that small minority of American manufacturers who directly compete with China.  So not only is Trump saying that he knows better than us about what we should be consuming, but Trump's also saying that because we just can't help ourselves but buy cheap Chinese goods ("ooh, they're so cheap and pastic-y"), he has no choice but to enlist the full force of the US government to stop us from harming ourselves.  President Trump will tell us to pay more for less in order to line the pockets of a select few because we're just too dumb and helpless, and we can't be trusted to make the decisions that he, and he alone, deems "right."

It's for our own good, you see.  Now please someone, anyone, explain to me how this is the policy of a fiscal conservative?

(Answer: it's not.)

Look, the truth is that China presents some real challenges for American businesses and the US government, and they should both continue to smartly and lawfully pressure China to reform its troublesome policies (while getting the United States' own messy house in order).  But it's absurd to think that the Great Red Menace is coming to steal our jobs and eat our lunches.  In reality, China's economy is at a very precarious point, and if the Chinese government doesn't find a way to change course, the country's headed for a Japan-style collapse, as this recent article made clear.  But, hey, maybe that fact explains why Trump, while (fake) contemplating the presidency back in 1990, said the exact same things about Japan that he's saying about China today.

Then again, maybe just like 1990, Trump's once again pulling a fast one on all of us and is just sopping up some free publicity in order to hawk his ties board game cologne TV show.  Unfortunately, even if Trump's candidacy is a joke (and I still think it probably is), his China "policy" has gained real traction among the American public and some influential conservative pundits.

And that's far more disturbing than Trump's current poll numbers.

Tuesday Quick Hits

Work's been pretty rough these last few days, but here are some quick hits to get you through the slower blogtimes:

• "Zeroing" took yet another hit last week: this time by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which ruled last Thursday that the Department of Commerce needs to revisit its use of the WTO-illegal methodology in antidumping annual reviews because (i) DOC had abandoned the practice in investigations; and (ii) the US government had failed to offer a good (well, any) reason for the different approach in reviews.  WorldTradeLaw.net's Simon Lester offers some good commentary on the CAFC decision, and the WSJ rightfully applauds it: "thanks to statistical sleight-of-hand, American consumers have paid billions of dollars more over the years in higher prices either because antidumping duties raised prices on imports or because those duties sheltered domestic companies from downward price competition. This was bad economics, and now it turns out it was bad law, too. The World Trade Organization has dinged Washington repeatedly for zeroing. Commerce and Congress have done their best to avoid complying, at considerable expense to American credibility abroad. Most recently, Commerce attempted to stop zeroing for new antidumping investigations while keeping the practice for existing duties, to placate both the WTO and domestic protectionists. Last week's appellate court ruling puts an end to that charade by finding that under existing U.S. law Commerce has to either zero in all cases or zero in none. Since the department has abandoned zeroing for new investigations, there's reason to hope the Obama Administration will disavow zeroing entirely instead of searching for some way around a carefully reasoned and forceful appellate ruling."  Indeed.  I'd only add that the US courts have been the last refuge of America's zeroing proponents (i.e., protectionists) and their buddies in Congress, so the CAFC's latest decision must have them squirming something fierce this week.  And that thought makes me smile.

• Politicians of both parties are lining up in support of the US-Colombia FTA - a strong signal that the Obama administration could finally send the Agreement to Congress sometime soon (everybody likes a winner!).  Dem Senators Baucus and Kerry gave the FTA a nice (albeit mercantilist) plug in a recent WSJ op-ed, and the (admittedly dwindling) New Democrat Coalition in the House fired off a letter to the President calling on him to submit all three pending FTAs asap.  Meanwhile the US business community is also upping the pressure, as this US Chamber blogpost and Caterpillar ad make clear.  Eternal optimist Monica Showalter of IBD has gleefully noticed all of this news and notes something important on Facebook: "With Obama and Santos scheduled to meet Thursday, and Santos refusing up until this point to meet Obama unless there's free trade - I think it is going to happen."  A very insightful point, and I hope she's right, but I'll believe it when I see it.  (Although this announcement re: the Canada-Colombia FTA certainly adds more pressure on the USA.) [Update: Monica has more in this new IBD editorial.]

• Speaking of that Kerry-Baucus op-ed, Cafe Hayek's Don Boudreaux gives it "two cheers," and withholds the third because of something that I've been arguing here for a long time: "A third cheer would be in order had not the senators relied upon a wholly mistaken reason to justify this particular move toward freer trade. In their essay, U.S. imports and American consumers are mentioned a total of zero times, while U.S. exports and American producers (such as farmers, firms, and workers) are mentioned 23 times.... The senators’ argument for freer trade in this particular case undermines the larger effort to persuade the public that free trade is to everyone’s long-term advantage – an advantage that is measured by increases in what we’re able to consume and not by increases in what we must sacrifice."  Exactly!!

• Cato's Ted Galen Carptenter explains why China's inevitable rise to superpower status isn't so inevitable, and why the United States has a lot to say about it.

• The Mercatus Center's Veronique de Rugy explains something I already know and have known for a few years now: the Alternative Minimum Tax sucks and should be eliminated asap.  Mind-blowing fact: "Congress created the AMT in 1969 to prevent 155 wealthy taxpayers from using deductions and credits to avoid paying any federal income taxes....  According to the Congressional Budget Office, last tax season 4.5 million taxpayers were affected by the alternative minimum tax, an increase of more than 4 million taxpayers since 1970."  Sonova...

• The WSJ Asia pens an excellent editorial on how the Japan tragedies have clearly revealed just how dependent American businesses and workers are on imports in this modern era of global supply chains.  The whole thing is worth reading, but here's my favorite passage: "Despite the fears of Japanese products a generation ago, in reality those imports have allowed America to keep its place as the world's largest economy by a country mile. We hope someone on President Obama's economic team is taking note. Trade opponents can always point to the jobs they claim trade has "cost" Americans, but it's rarer to see such an obvious example of how Americans are hurt when trade is suddenly interrupted. The point extends to imports from everywhere. American auto-industry fears over car imports from South Korea have so far helped block ratification of a Korea-U.S. free-trade agreement. That bit of politics hurts Americans who would export to Korea under the deal, but it also hurts the Americans who would benefit from Korean imports. Such as, say, small businesses that use pick-up trucks and currently face higher domestic prices and less competition thanks to a 25% tariff on imported trucks."  Amen.

• Last week USTR released its annual national trade estimate (NTE) report on foreign trade barriers.  It's never anything earth-shattering (and involves a lot of cut-and-pasting from previous years), but it's still a good place to find the next US WTO dispute or two.  (If you don't mind wading through the chaff.)

• Paul Ryan: Stud.

Now that should keep you busy until I come up for air...

Can America Compete with Cheap Labor Countries?

One of the constant refrains you hear from people opposing trade liberalization is that, sure, it sounds good in theory, but in reality free trade is a disaster for America because the USA simply cannot compete with low-wage countries like China, and thus "outsourcing" will crush the American worker while enriching fat-cat industrialists.  But does this argument jibe with reality?

In short, no.

Thomas Heffner of Economy in Crisis provides a good example of the protectionists' most basic outsourcing argument:

American workers can not and should not have to compete with third world wage rates. Some Chinese manufacturers are paid 33 cents an hour according to a 2005 AFLCIO report. This cents-an-hour pay in many countries around the world has caused American companies and entire industries to move abroad (see the lost industry list here). It also led Princeton economist Alan Blinder to estimate 42-56 million jobs could potentially be sent overseas.

And trust me, Heffner is not alone - instances of this argument literally flood the interwebs (and our political discourse).  But unfortunately for the folks using such simplistic defeatism to justify their protectionist policies, their arguments simply cannot withstand scrutiny when checked against the actual facts on the ground, which show that labor costs are only one of many factors that executives consider when deciding where to locate a factory.  That fact is made abundantly clear in this new FT story:

Most big US manufacturing companies are considering relocating factories from low-cost Asian countries to the US or Latin America as they face rising logistics and transport costs, according to a report being released today by Accenture, the consultants.

The earthquake and tsunami in Japan, which have wreaked havoc on global supply chains, have underlined how multinational manufacturers can find themselves stranded without critical components.

For example, General Motors, the US carmaker, plans to stop production today at a factory in Louisiana that makes pick-up trucks, due to lack of parts normally supplied from Japan.

Boeing, the aircraft-maker whose 787 Dreamliner relies on Japanese manufacturers for more than a third of its parts, said it had enough inventory of components for the next few weeks, but was unsure of supplies beyond that. Jamco, the Japanese company that makes the 787’s galleys, warned that deliveries could be affected by fuel shortages.

Caterpillar, the world’s largest manufacturer of earthmoving equipment by revenues, said its factories around the world could be “sporadically impacted” by the disruption to its Japanese supply chain. The company has already located alternative sources for components produced by its Japanese suppliers.

The problems in Japan could prompt big manufacturers to reassess the risks in their global supply chains. The Accenture report suggests that, long before the earthquake, such companies were already looking at simplifying supply chains by bringing them closer to end-markets.

Some 61 per cent of manufacturing executives surveyed by the consultancy said they were considering more closely matching supply location with demand location by onshoring or “nearshoring” manufacturing and supply.

Matt Reilly, Accenture’s managing director of process and innovation performance, said that this could lead to a wave of factory relocations in the next three years as big US manufacturers move production from Asia to the US and Latin America. “In the past five years, companies were driving at labour cost arbitrage and lower material costs,” Mr Reilly said.

“But now that oil and transportation prices have gone up, productivity gains are not as big as they were, and there are issues around risk in supply chains, companies are starting to go where the customers are, instead of where the raw materials are.” He said the shift was also being driven by customer demands for quicker supply times and greater customisation.

“A lot of what’s going on in manufacturing innovation is about trying to get customer feedback quickly and injecting that back into the supply chain, so that features and functions can be changed quickly,” he said. “It’s tough to do that when you’ve got stuff going on in Thailand or Japan.”

A string of other international companies have also cautioned that their supply chains could be disrupted by the Japan quake, including Sony Ericsson, Volkswagen, Volvo and GKN, the UK car and aerospace components manufacturer.

In short, yes, labor costs are a factor in corporate sourcing, and sometimes a big one (especially for low-end manufacturing), but the idea that America simply can't compete with low-wage nations based solely on the wage differential is a huge fallacy.  And it's been a fallacy for a long time now (especially when fuel costs are on the rise).  Of course, anyone with a good grasp of basic economics coulda told you that, but it's certainly nice when reality so neatly tracks theory, isn't it?

Lots more on the outsourcing myth here, if you're interested.

Tuesday Quick Hits

Happy belated early St. Patty's Day.  Here are some links to keep your lucky streak going:

• AEI's Phil Levy writes a great column about the likely economic aftershocks of the Japan tragedies caused by, among other things, global supply chains.  The WSJ follows (intentionally or not) Levy's lead with an interesting report on how Japan's problems should affect its exports to China (and thus Chinese exports of goods typically made from the imported Japanese inputs).

• Speaking of Levy, he provides a very good explanation of why China's Indigenous Innovation policy can't achieve China's long-term policy goals but should be a priority for the United States because of the significant near-term pain it'll cause American companies.

• The absurd, needless expiration of the US Generalized System of Preferences cost American manufacturers $54.4 million in January alone.  Awesome.

• Last week's BEA release of the US trade deficit stats elicited a typically awful write-up from the AP.  The forces of good appropriately correct the journalist responsible here, here, here and here. 

• The Heritage Foundation's Walter Lohman and Derek Scissors deftly analyze something that I noticed about a year ago: Australia's China policy is very, very sound.  And, as if on cue, the Aussies provide even more proof of this fact.

• I selfishly hate the relatively new starting date for Daylight Savings Time because it makes getting out of bed to go for a jog excruciatingly difficult, but now I have a more altruistic, economic reason to hate it.  Bonus.

• In reporting on the latest developments in the longstanding US-Canada softwood lumber dispute, the Economist provides another great lesson on the fleeting benefits and long-terms costs of protectionism. 

• The Washington Post confirms what we already knew: the White House, not USTR, drives American trade policy. 

• More excellent destruction of self-avowed protectionist Ian Fletcher's public "arguments" by Cafe Hayek's Don Boudreaux here, here, here and here.  To my knowledge, Fletcher has yet to respond directly to any of Boudreaux's killer critiques.

• And finally, this is absolutely hilarious (h/t Radley Balko).

Enjoy!

ECIPE: Umm, Yeah, About that Scary "China Trade Surplus"

The free market European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) has just published a new report which reinforces a lot of the things I've been saying here about China's currency, those "dangerous" global imbalances, and the effects of multinational supply chains on the global economy (and conventional trade statistics):

Alarmed by the persistent and large US trade deficit vis-à-vis China and the rapidly swelling Chinese foreign exchange reserves, influential US policymakers are urging the Chinese authorities to allow a substantial appreciation of the Renminbi (RMB).  This paper establishes that the arguments advanced to this effect are quite weak, as they overlook salient features of the present international economy and of China’s financial system.  Indeed, the record growth of China’s exports to the US stems largely from joint ventures and affiliates of multinational enterprises; exports attributed to China usually contain a large percentage of imported components with modest value-added attributed to China itself and – indeed, the Chinese export portfolio is in the process of being significantly upgraded.  Neither are the gigantic foreign exchange reserves primarily linked to the modest surpluses of exports over imports of China, but they are fed by these large net inward direct investments; and, in recent years, by ‘hot money’ which sneaks into China, notwithstanding the non-convertibility of capital flows. Thus, a moderate appreciation of the RMB would not equilibrate the bilateral trade flows or remedy current account imbalances. On the other hand, the shift in China’s growth strategy – away from export maximisation towards strengthening consumption in the vast interior – is likely to gradually bring about more balance, while appreciating the RMB in the process.  There are also recent signs of easing of Chinese restrictions on international financial transactions.

Good stuff.  Be sure to read the whole thing here.  It provides another much-needed counterweight to the seemingly endless supply of misinformation and misunderstanding out there about China and trade deficits.

Speaking of which, today's news that the US-China trade deficit reached an all-time high in 2010 was met with the usual (and ridiculous) media and politico frothing.  As I've noted here innumerable times, all of that froth relies on the same old - and repeatedly debunked - conventional wisdom that a trade deficit is some sort of harbinger of economic doom, and that bilateral trade balances are accurate barometers of national and international trade policies.  (Dan Griswold adds a little more commentary on these points today.)  And, of course, it doesn't take a brilliant economist - or even a dumb trade lawyer like me - to notice that the significant expansion of the US trade deficit between 2009 and 2010 coincided quite nicely with - hey, look at that! - the significant increase in annual GDP growth between those same years (2009 at 0.2% vs. 2010 at 2.8%).

So here's a crazy idea.  Maybe it's time for media frothers to drop the obviously-wrong conventional wisdom and open their eyes for a change.  Heck, maybe they could, oh I don't know, read stuff like the new ECIPE study - or any of the myriad others like it - and actually learn something about our fascinating 21st century global economy and the silly politicians who can't - or choose not to - comprehend it.

Monday Quick Hits

Here are a few headlines to quell your Super Bowl / Reagan birthday hangovers:

• In a great new op-ed, the Boston Globe's Jeff Jacoby explains the current dominance of American manufacturing.  He concludes: "A vast amount of 'stuff' is still made in the USA, albeit not the inexpensive consumer goods that fill the shelves in Target or Walgreens. American factories make fighter jets and air conditioners, automobiles and pharmaceuticals, industrial lathes and semiconductors. Not the sort of things on your weekly shopping list? Maybe not. But that doesn’t change economic reality. They may have 'clos[ed] down the textile mill across the railroad tracks.' But America’s manufacturing glory is far from a thing of the past." Mark Perry has more here.

• Tim Carney reports on yet another highly-subsidized green energy bankruptcy.  As I've noted repeatedly, the United States is absolutely awesome at producing green energy debacles.  Carney reports: "To turn wood chips into ethanol fuel, George W. Bush's Department of Energy in February 2007 announced a $76 million grant to Range Fuels for a cutting-edge refinery.  A few months later, the refinery opened in the piney woods of Treutlen County, Ga., as the taxpayers of Georgia piled on another $6 million.  In 2008, the ethanol plant was the first beneficiary of the Biorefinery Assistance Program, pocketing a loan for $80 million guaranteed by the U.S. taxpayers.  Last month, the refinery closed down, having failed to squeeze even a drop of ethanol out of its pine chips.  The Soperton, Ga., ethanol plant is another blemish on ethanol's already tarnished image, but more broadly, it is cautionary tale about the elusive nature of 'green jobs' and the folly of the government's efforts at 'investing' -- as President Obama puts it -- in new technologies."

• WTO Director General Pascal Lamy continues to beat the trade statistics drum:  "Another significant change in the international trade landscape is the spread of globally-integrated production chains — in effect, global factories — as firms locate various stages of the production process in the most cost-efficient markets.... The sports equipment industry is another example that typifies the new global production network pattern. For instance, the blueprint of a sport shoe is designed and conceived in a research lab in the United States, but manufactured in factories located in China, Vietnam or Indonesia, using raw materials such as leather, rubber and plastic from neighbouring Asian countries. You locate the different stages of your activities from creation to production, marketing and distribution in order to maximise efficiencies and optimise your value addition chain."

• Behold, the depressing state of trade policy/politics in the Democratic Party. "The Democratic Leadership Council, the iconic centrist organization of the Clinton years, is out of money and could close its doors as soon as next week, a person familiar with the plans said Monday." As you may recall, the DLC has in recent years often been the lone Democratic voice in favor of trade liberalization.  So how many columns will be written about "epistemic closure" on the Left?  (Obvious answer: none.)

• Big free market think tanks oppose extension of Trade Adjustment Assistance (which Congress is mulling this week).  First, Heritage's David Mulhausen shows that "TAA is ineffective in raising the wages of participants" and thus should die.  His colleague James Skerk adds more, arguing that Congress should let the program expire because "very few workers lose their jobs because of foreign trade, and the Department of Labor’s Dislocated Workers Program already provides basic services to laid-off workers."  Finally, Cato's Sallie James provides three good reasons why TAA deserves the axe: (i) very few people lose their jobs due to import competition; (ii) it costs a fortune ($2.4 billion in 2011!); and (iii) as the trade stagnation/regression of 2006-2010 proves, TAA has done nothing to convince trade skeptics to support liberalization initiatives.  I'd only add - as Sallie's 2007 paper on TAA notes - one more big reason why TAA stinks: it reinforces the (false) idea that imports are bad, and that trade is zero sum. For more on that point, I highly recommend this classic NYT op-ed by economist Steven Landsburg on the subject.  He notes: "One way to think about [TAA] is to ask what your moral instincts tell you in analogous situations.  Suppose, after years of buying shampoo at your local pharmacy, you discover you can order the same shampoo for less money on the Web.  Do you have an obligation to compensate your pharmacist?  If you move to a cheaper apartment, should you compensate your landlord?  When you eat at McDonald’s, should you compensate the owners of the diner next door?  Public policy should not be designed to advance moral instincts that we all reject every day of our lives."  Amen.

• Via the Kauffman Foundation's Tim Kane comes today's Chart of the Day on real GDP per capita.  Kane notes, "It shows international comparisons of real GDP per person which come from the Penn World Tables (mark 6.3, chain weighted), relative to the United States level. Notice how developing countries tend to converge toward the U.S. level, then crash back to the European norm of a 70-80 percent ratio.... I find that this chart is especially useful for keeping China fever in perspective.... To be fair, China is big, so it can have an immature economy and still throw a lot of weight around. But history says it, too, will have a very hard time making the transition to a mature economy, let alone an entrepreneurial one."

Tuesday Quick Hits

A lot of very interesting things have come across my (virtual) desk over the last few days, and many of them support the things I've been discussing here over the last few months.  I highly recommend reading some, if not all, of these in full:

• Harvard's Edward Glaeser discusses why the "morality" of modern economics is rooted in human freedom (h/t Fred Smalkin).  In so doing, he underscores one of the big themes of Dan Ikenson's and my new paper on the broader case for free trade, its inherent morality: "Improvements in welfare occur when there are improvements in utility, and those occur only when an individual gets an option that wasn’t previously available. We typically prove that someone’s welfare has increased when the person has an increased set of choices. When we make that assumption (which is hotly contested by some people, especially psychologists), we essentially assume that the fundamental objective of public policy is to increase freedom of choice. Our opponents have every right to contend that economists are unwisely idolizing liberty, but they err by saying we sail without a moral North Star. Economists’ fondness for freedom rarely implies any particular policy program. A fondness for freedom is perfectly compatible with favoring redistribution, which can be seen as increasing one person’s choices at the expense of the choices of another, or with Keynesianism and its emphasis on anticyclical public spending. Many regulations can even be seen as force for freedom, like financial rules that help give all investors the freedom to invest in stocks by trying to level the playing field.  The belief in freedom does, however, create a predilection for human interaction and trade.  As [Milton] Friedman wrote, 'The most important single central fact about a free market is that no exchange takes place unless both parties benefit.' For many economists, defending free trade isn’t just about gross domestic product; it’s fighting for core values of freedom and human interdependence.  As [Adam] Smith said, 'To give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation.'  Economists are often wary of moral exhortation, as many see the harm so often wrought by arguments that are long on passion and short on sense. But don’t think that our discipline doesn’t have a moral spine beneath all the algebra. That spine is a fundamental belief in freedom."

• The Economist: based on a rough (but very reasonable and scholarly) esitmate, trade with China has saved American consumers approximately $780 billion(!) between 2001 and 2010.  Chinese President Hu Jintao said it was around $600 billion, and the magazine's back-of-the-envelope confirmation of Hu's claim definitely calls for more research.  Nevertheless, WOW!

• Dallas Fed further confirms what we already knew: China's currency policy is not the primary driver of the US-China current account balance: "Normally, a fast-growing economy such as China would borrow money from the rest of the world instead of lending. An obvious suspect in China’s mounting current account surplus is the fixed exchange rate between its yuan and the dollar. An undervalued yuan makes Chinese products cheaper than those of competitors in international markets. As a result, China exports more than it imports. According to this explanation, yuan appreciation could rebalance the global economy. This argument has at least two flaws. First, the durability of the U.S.–China imbalance is difficult to explain. In order for the exchange rate to affect import prices, those prices can’t adjust.... Although in reality prices cannot change instantly, they do adjust over the long run; therefore, the exchange rate has only short-term effects on import prices and the current account. China has run a significant trade surplus against the U.S. for about 10 years (Chart 2). It is hard to imagine that prices have not fully adjusted to offset the exchange rate after such a long period. Second, an appreciating yuan may only minimally reduce the imbalance. Even in the short run, the exchange rate’s impact on import prices would be quite limited, studies have shown. Exporters usually pass on only a fraction of exchange rate movements when setting prices. About 20 percent of exchange rate changes were reflected in U.S. import prices during the past decade, Federal Reserve economists Mario Marazzi and Nathan Sheets found. Profit margins usually absorb some of exchange rate movement as exporters seek to maintain market share. Additionally, the currency under which import prices are invoiced also affects the exchange rate pass-through. Most U.S. imports from China are priced in dollars, and their prices are fixed in the short run. In this case, depreciation of the dollar against the yuan has no short-run effect on import prices from China."

• The FT's Clive Crook (rightly) dismantles Obama's State of the Union Address (h/t Phil Levy).  He hits on many of the problems with "competitiveness" and "investment" that I've discussed here at length.  My favorite lines: "The metaphor of growth as a race with winners and losers – all that stuff in the speech about Sputnik moments, falling behind, winning the 21st century – is nonsense. Over the long haul, if US productivity rises, so will US living standards. Why should growth in China or India hold back US productivity? No reason at all. Once conditioned to think “productivity” whenever a politician says “competitiveness”, you look at economic policy differently. Winning begins to seem overrated. What exactly do we win, you wonder? Being number one in worldwide production of solar panels would be nice, but how would that raise economy-wide productivity? The key to improving living standards lies not in winning the race to develop showcase technologies, but in accumulating capital, diffusing knowledge and accommodating the disruption that this entails."

• China is starting to experience some pretty significant trade diversion, but (unsurprisingly) very little of the sourcing is heading to the United States: "More than half of international buyers have tended to increase their sourcing from India and Vietnam due to continuous export price hikes from China, according to a recent survey by the Global Sources, a trade information provider.... Workers in Vietnam, however, are said to need twice as much time to finish one task, the Global Sources said. 30% of respondents said they plan to increase sourcing from Thailand. However, export price may not be the polled buyers' sole consideration, for 7% of them are considering increasing imports from countries that have higher production costs than China, including South Korea, Japan, the United States and the European Union."

• Meanwhile, the NYT notices (again) that Chinese inflation may shrink the US-China trade deficit.  Color me shockedtotally and utterly unsurprised.  Although most of this article just updates what we've already known for a while now, I think it's worthwhile to note this passage about the deleterious effects of higher Chinese import prices on US consumers: "The higher Chinese prices will tend to show up mainly in products like inexpensive clothing and other commodity goods in which labor and raw materials represent a bigger part of the final value — rather than in sophisticated electronics like Apple iPads, in which Chinese assembly is only a small fraction of the cost."  In short, the pain will mainly be felt by poorer American consumers and US manufacturers.  Wealthier Americans?  Not so much.  And yet it's the politicians who claim to "care" most about America's poor and the US manufacturing sector - and who demonize America's "rich" - that have for years now been demanding more expensive Chinese imports.  Maybe they're not telling us the whole story, huh?

• WTO Director General Pascal Lamy, channeling Cato's Dan Ikenson, explains in the FT why "Made in China’ tells us little about global trade": "As recently as 30 years ago, products were assembled in one country, using inputs from that same country. Measuring trade was thus easy. 2011 is very different. Manufacturing is driven by global supply chains, while most imports should be stamped “made globally”, not “made in China”, or similar. This is not an academic distinction. With trade imbalance causing friction between leading economies, the measures we use can gravely exacerbate geopolitical tensions at a time when co-operation is more vital than ever."  Good stuff from DG Lamy, but, yes, it should all sound very familiar.  However, I did find this stat to be new and interesting: "Measures we use also change the way trade affects jobs too. Research on Apple’s iPod shows that out of the 41,000 jobs its manufacture created in 2006, 14,000 were located in the US. Some 6,000 were professional posts. Yet since US workers are better paid, they earned $750m, while only $320m went to workers abroad. Indeed, the iPod may have never existed if Apple had not known that Asian companies could supply components, while both Asian workers and Asian consumers would manufacture and buy it. Statistics that measure value added can provide a more reliable way of seeing how trade affects employment."  And speaking of the WTO and trade statistics, the trade body is hosting a big seminar on the subject this week.

• The Heritage Foundation's Anthony Kim explains just how far Colombia has come in terms of economic and political freedom.  Maybe it's time we implemented that FTA, huh?

• China expert Lee Miller explains why the conventional wisdom (and hope?) that China's banking sector will be more, ahem, reserved in 2011 may be misguided.  Bizarre stuff.

• America is silly rich and relatively equal.  Also from the NYT's Economix blog comes your chart of the day on global income inequality, which shows that (i) contrary to the breathless claims of certain lefty bloggers out there, the United States is absolutely nothing like Brazil (or other major developing countries) when it comes to income inequality;and (ii) the "bottom 5 percent of the American income distribution is still richer than 68 percent of the world’s inhabitants" and "about as rich as India's richest."  Check it out:

• The always-great Becker-Posner Blog has more on inequality here (and here).  It's nothing groundbreaking, but definitely worth a read.

• More of the same: US manufacturing sector expands for the 18th straight month. Yawn. BUT, there is this little nugget: "The ISM Employment Index increased in January to 61.7%, which is the 16th consecutive month of growth in manufacturing employment and the highest reading for the ISM manufacturing employment index since April of 1973."  Don Boudreaux has more insights, including a link to a neat new story from MSNBC on the state of US manufacturing, here.

That should keep you busy for a while.  Now get to reading!